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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

ST1\TE OF UTAH
RONALD JENSEN, by his Guardian
Ad Litem, Sverre Jensen,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 8149

_ MARTINS. TAYLOR,

Defendant and Appell·ant.
.;r. .

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF F'ACT
At the intersection of 13th East and 5th South in
/ Salt Lake City, right after midnight on the morning
--" of October 21, 1952, a collision occurred between a Chev/ rolet convertible being driven by Seth M. Oberg, Jr., and
a Salt Lake City fire truck being driven by defendant,
Martin S. Taylor. The Oberg car was proceeding west
on 5th South in the lane north of and next to the center
and the fire truck was responding to a fire alarm and
was proceeding south in the lane west of and next to the
center of 13th South. Plaintiff was riding as a guest in
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the Oberg car. Ken F·outz was also riding as a guest
between plaintiff and Oberg, all three sitting on the front
seat, Oberg to the left side. As a result of the collision
plaintiff received serious injuries and brought suit
against the driver of the fire truck.
The allegations of negligence as sta.ted in the pretrial order ( p 9) , are :
1. That defendant drove at a rate of speed greater
than was safe, reasonable and prudent in view of the
surrounding circumstances, to-wit, at a speed in excess
of 35 miles per hour.
2. Defendant failed to keep a proper lookout for
other vehicles in the intersection.
3. D·efendant failed to keep the fire truck under
safe, reasonable, and proper control while driving
through the intersection.
4. That immediately prior to his entering the intersection, defendant did not have his flasher light flashing
or his siren sounding.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence the defendant made a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
1. The evidence fails to show defendant was negligent in any of the particulars alleged in the complaint or
referred to in the pre-trial order.
2. The accident happened solely because of the failure of the driver of the ca:f in which plaintiff \Vas riding
to heed the warnings given by the siren and red light,
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as provided by statute, and negligence of the driver was
the sole proxirnate cause of the accident.
3. Plaintiff himself did not exercise reasonable care
in the approach to the intersection in failing to hear the
siren or see the red light or to take any precaution for his
own safety.
This motion was denied. Since we have assigned as
error the denial of this 1notion, we desire first to give
the state of the record at that point in the trial.
Lorin R. Farnsworth testified that he was driving
about 50 to 60 feet behind the Oberg car right up to the
time Oberg entered the intersection. They were going
55 or 60 miles per hour. As they approached 13th East,
the red sen1aphore light was on and Oberg applied his
brakes momentarily, as did also Farnsworth. The light
changed to green and Oberg proceeded on through at
approximately 35 miles per hour (pp. 42-44). When
Farnsworth was at about the point on 5th South indicated
by an "x" in a circle on Exhibit P-13, a map of the intersection, he saw the fire truck coming south at about the
point marked "x" on 13th South, which is just at the north
edge of the cross walk across 13th East. F'arnsworth
'vas then about 50 feet east of the cross walk. At that
time he heard the siren and saw the red ligh.t. He applied
his brakes and stopped at the intersection and then proceeded across the street (p. 44). At the time he heard
and saw the fire truck, Oberg's car was about 50 feet in
front of him. At that time Oberg's car vvas close to the
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east cross walk, even with the car that was stopped on
that side of the street ( p. ±7). This car that stopped wa~
not out into the intersection at all (p. 49). Farnsworth
discovered that the tie rod on the right front wheel of
the fire truck was broken off (p. 64). He went over to the
Oberg car and turned the radio off, which was on about
the average way you would usually have it on (p. 46).
Frank W. Nielson testified that he was stopped for
the red light heading west on 5th South on the east side
of 13th East. He had stopped immediately behind the
cross walk (p. 66). As the light turned green he moved
up 3 or 4 feet before he saw the fire engine and then
stopped. Just as the light turned green, he saw the red
light on the truck and heard the siren, the truck being
then about one-half block north of the intersection. As the
fire truck approached the intersection, the Oberg car
carne by his left and a collision occurred in the center of
the intersection. Both vehicles proceeded straight ahead
without the application of brakes. Asked whether the
truck increased or decreased its speed he answered, BNot
that I could notice or recall."
On cross examination he testified that while he was
stopped waiting for the light to change his front wheels
were just about at the east edge of the cross walk. His
windows were up and he heard the siren quite loud and
saw the red flashing light while he ·was waiting. He
judged the speed of the truck to be from 20 to 30 miles
per hour (p. 69). The fire truck was approximately at
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the cross 'valk north of the intersection as the Oberg car
passed his car. He also testified that while he was stopped
at the west edge of the cross walk he could see north
three-quarters of a block (pp. 71, 72).
Walter Jensen was driving east on 5th South in a
Hudson and stopped at the intersection at 13th East for
the red light. Just before the light turned green he saw
the fire truck coming south on 13th East three-quarters
of a block away (p. 52). When it was about one-half
block away the light turned. red against the fireman and
green for Jensen. He saw the red light on the fire truck.
He judged the fire truck "\Vas traveling 30 or 40 miles an
hour. When asked if the fire truck decreased its speed as
it approached he testified, "It was not apparent that it decreased its speed at all. It seemed like it came on at the
same rate." (p. 54). It "\Vas at the north cross walk when
he last saw it. He did not see the actual collision (p. 53).
·On cross-examination he testified that it was then a good
three-quarters of a block away when he first heard the
siren. His windows were closed and the siren kept getting louder as it approached. He also saw the red flasher
light when he first heard the siren, when the truck was all
of 500 feet away (p. 56).
Seth Oberg testified that when he was about 200 feet
east of 13th East on 5th South the red light was against
him and slowed down to between 20 and 25 miles per hour
(p. 77). When about 150 feet east of the east cross walk,
he noticed the light was about to change to yellow. He
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let his foot off the brake and coasted down to the intersection. The light turned green when he was 50 to 7~ feet
east of the cross walk. He was then going 20 to 25 1niles
per hour. He looked to the right but there was a car on
his right that blocked his vision up north. He looked
to the left and when he looked right again he was out in
the center of the intersection and all he had seen was some
red light coming to the right side of his car (p. 78). He
was right in the center of the intersection when he first
saw the red light of the approaching vehicle, which was
then just past the north cross walk across 13th East. At
that time Oberg was traveling 25 miles per hour (p. 80).
The radio was on soft (p. 83). His automobile was a cloth
top convertible through which you could hear quite a bit
better than through the ordinary metal top (p. 87). He
was about 50 feet east of the parked car when he saw the
light changed to green (p·. 88). He looked to the north
when he was 15 to 25 feet east of the parked car and continued looking north until he was alongside the car (p.
89). The front of the parked car was even with the west
end of the island, which goes down to the east side of the
cross walk (p. 90). He savv no cars coming south on 13th
East as he looked north. The impact occurred about under the street semaphore and his car was hit right behind
the door ( p. 93). He saw no flasher signal and heard no
siren (p. 94). At the time he looked north and before he
was even with the parked car, he could see through the
trees but saw nothing. He continued looking north until
even with the car and th.en the car obstructed his vision
(p. 97).
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Ronald Jensen, the plaintiff, testified that as they
approached within 100 yards of 13th East they were going
35 or more miles per hour. As they approached the intersection the light turned green (p. 107). He looked
up north when they were about 30 feet east of the east
side of the cross walk, just back of the Nielson car (p.
110). He was sitting on the right side of the car, but he
saw nothing, no red light (p. 109), and heard no siren (p.
119). That is the last he remembers. While there were
trees there to the north he could not say if they obstructed
his view. He did not look that close ( p. 120).
This constitutes all of plaintiff's evidence as to how
the accident happened. Plaintiff also called George Peterson, a police officer, who made the measurements after
the accident and placed the results on the map of the
intersection, exhibit P-13. Peterson fixed the point of impact by a dot with a circle around it on exhibit P-13, which
is west of the center line of 13th East and north of the
center of 5th South and is near the traffic semaphore
(p. 24). The truck was stopped 199 feet south of the
point of impact, measured to the front bumper (p. 25).
There were tire 1narks made by the fire truck extending
in a straight line for a distance of 120 feet north from
the center of the left front wheel. They may have been
lighter or darker in spot::; (p. 28). He measured the
marks on the left side and they went to the left front
wheel (p. 28) but he did not know on the right side (p.
33). He saw evidence of front wheel tire marks on the
left side, but not on the right side. He didn't examine the
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right marks up to the wheel. He did not examine the tire
marks closest to the gutter (p. 32). He traced the left
tire mark back to the beginning but did not observe where
the left front took hold, nor could he tell how far the right
front tire mark went (p. 33).
Plaintiff also called S. S. Taylor, traffic engineer,
Salt Lake City, who wa.s asked a hypothetical question
based on various elements assumed to be existing at the
time of the accident and from such he gave his opinion
that the truck was traveling at the point where the brake
marks, testified to by Peterson, began between 30 or 50
miles per hour (p.180). He admitted on cross examination that it would make a difference in his opinion if (a)
the evidence failed to show that the front wheels were
locked from the time the brakes were put on; (b) if the
tire marks testified to by Peterson were not actually
friction marks on the pavement (p. 183) ; (c) if all 4
marks, those from the front wheels and rear wheels on
each side, did not run the entire distance (p. 184); (d)
if the rear tires, which are not visible on the photo (exhibit P-1) and from which h·e obtained his information
a.s to the condition of the front tires, were not substantially in the same condition as the front tires; (e) if the
brake marks on both sides \Vere not continuous and uninterrupted (p. 185).
He also testified if all the wheels both front and rear
were locked and sliding, and all the other assumed factors
were present, the truck was traveling 44 to 50 miles per
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hour, and if all the wheels, except the right front, 'vere
locked and sliding at the time the brake mark first appeared, the truck would be going between 38 and 44 miles
per hour.
Defendant's evidence "ras as follows:
There were four firemen riding the fire truck, defendant Martin s. Taylor driving, Lt. Arthur C. Halladay riding beside defendant, Kenneth E. Wells and Richard H. Taylor riding the rear tail board. All four testified that the siren was sounded and the red flasher lights
were on all the way from the fire station at 258 South 13th
East to the point of impact and that the siren gives a loud
noise and can be heard for at least 3 blocks and red
flasher lights can be seen for at least 2 blocks.
Defendant testified that when about 300 feet north of
5th South he was traveling about 40 miles per hour and
the traffic light at the intersection was red (p. 130). He
then applied his brakes and slowed down to a point about
125 feet north of the intersection, then going about 25
miles per hour. During this interim he looked to the east
and west. He saw the Nielson car waiting on the east side
and the Jensen car waiting on the west side. He then
released his brakes and accelerated his speed ( p. 131). He
could have stopped if he had had to, but when he saw the
cars holding up for him he released the brakes (p. 135).
He did not see the Oberg car until Lt. Halladay yelled,
"Lookout!" He was then right in the middle of the intersection, a few feet north of the semaphore. He was then
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going 30 or maybe 35 miles per h·our (p. 131). His speed
acceleration had been steady. He did not recall that he
looked east at any time in the last 100 or 125 feet before
the impact. He could not recall that he did. Counsel on
cross examination asked:

Q. "If you had looked in this period of time
I am speaking of just about 100 or 125 feet before
the impact some time during the course of your
look you would have seen this convertible as it
either approached the Nielson car or went by it
because the Nielson car was stopped, of course f'
A.

"Yes."

Q. "Isn't that

correct~"

A. "I imagine I could have seen it unless it
was right on the side at the time." (p. 143).
There was nothing but Nielson's car to block his
vision (p.143). As he so proceeded he was conscious of
the two cars being stopped and if they had started up
he would have noticed them. However, he could not have
seen the convertible if it had not overtaken the Nielson
car as he started to look ahead for traffic (p. 144).
Laverna Bishop (p. 145) and Mrs. J'. M. Baker
(p. 156) both lived on the third floor and on the south
side of the Charleston Apartments, located on the west
side of 13th East and son1e little distance north of 5th
South. They both testified they heard the sound of the
siren coming from the north (p. 147, 158) and that a
definite interval of time €·lapsed between first hearing
the siren and the thud of the impact. The siren kept get-
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ting louder as it approached the intersection, becoming
very loud according to J.\tiiss Bishop (p. 146-148). ~Irs.
Baker said she first heard the siren when it was \vay
down the street (p. 163).
Mrs. Harold H. Holmes, who lives on the east side
of 13th East, the second house north of the intersection,
was in bed when she heard the fire engine siren (p. 151).
It got louder as it approached the intersection. There was
a definite lapse of time between first hearing the siren
and the impact.
Sadie Pack, who lived at 501 South 13th East, the
south east corner of 13th East and 5th South was in a
room in a south-west corner of her home. The windows
were shut but she heard the siren and it was loud (p. 205).
Carl A. Taylor who lives about 300 feet east of the
intersection on the south side of 13th East, was in bed
when he heard the siren. The siren sound came from the
north and was as loud as usual, loud enough so he could
hear it in his house. He got up and looked out of the window and while at the window the crash occurred (p. 206208).
Lt. Arthur C. Halladay \Vas riding the fire truck with
the defendant driver. When about 250 feet north of the
intersection he says they were going 40 to 45 miles per
hour. The driver then slowed down until he got about
to the corner, when, seeing the traffic had all come to a
stop he proceeded on through the intersection. Just after
they had left the north cross walk he saw the Oberg car
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coming west at a liigh rate of speed, estimating 45 to 50
miles per hour. Halladay yelled "lookout" but the collision was inevitable. The crash occurred right underneath the semaphore. Because of a broken tie rod Halladay had to help steer the truck to a stop (p. 167). He saw
the Nielson car and the Jensen car stopped as the truck
came to the intersection. He saw the Oberg car pass the
Nielson car. The truck had then just passed the north
cross walk (p. 168). He also saw the ·Oberg car as it was
just about to pass the Nielson car. The truck was then
about even with the cross walk. The truck was going
about 35 miles per hour at the time of the impact (p. 169).
The speed of the truck was reduced to 30 to 35 miles per
hour before the driver started to accelerate again.
I

Kenneth E. Wells was riding on the left side of the
tail board standing holding to the handle provided for
such use (p. 172). He felt the driver hit the brakes and
slow down. He saw the Njelson car waiting when they
were about 300 feet from the corner, being on the left side
of the truck he was not able to see the Jensen car (p.173).
The defendant had the truck braked down to 25 to 35
miles an hour when about 125 feet north of the cross
walk. They were not quite in front of the Charleston.
Up to that point he saw no car other than Nielson's. The
truck then gradually accelerated its speed. Wells kept
looking east and first saw the Oberg car when the truck
was about at the cross walk. This was just before the
Oberg car passed the Nielson car. It 'vas going about
40 or 45 miles per hour. Wells just had time to holler
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to the other fireman on the tail board "hang on we can't
miss him." (p.174-175). He saw the Oberg car before it
passed the Nielson car and it showed no signs of slowing
down at all. The impact occurred about directly underneath the semaphore (p.175).
Richard H. Taylor, the other fireman riding on the
rear of the fire engine, testified the driver applied the
brakes about 300 feet fro1n the intersection and slowed
down until about 125 feet from the cross walk and then
continued on again. His speed was reduced from 40 to 45
to 25 to 30 miles an hour and then gradually increased
(p. ______ ). When they were about 125 feet north of the
intersection he first saw the Jensen car waiting. When
Wells said "we are going to hit" the witness saw both
the Nielson and the Oberg cars. The fire truck was then
at the south end of the north cross walk across 13th East.
There was just a flash and then they hit.
Ken Foutz, 26 years of age, was riding between plaintiff and Oberg in the convertible. The radio was on (p.
195). When they got almost to the intersection of 13th
East and 5th South he looked through the trees and saw
the fire engine (p. 196). The witness made a pencil mark
on Exhibit P-13 where the trees were. He also marked
with an ink "x" on Exhibit P-4 where the fire truck was
when he saw it. Exhibit P-4 is a photo of the intersection
looking west taken from a point a considerable distance
east of the intersection and shows the Charleston Apartments. At that time the convertible was about where
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the picture was taken (p. 197), \Yhich W'ould be a considerable distance east of the intersection, he saw the truck
and recognized it as a fire truck. He is certain he saw
the truck and lights but iG uncertain that he heard the
siren. But his best recollection is that he did hear it.
He became panicky as soon as he saw the truck. He
looked over at Oberg and looked back, and scared to death
but did not cry out or speak (p. 199-200).
William Y. Tipton, an engineer employed by Salt
Lake City, gave the following Ineasurements: the parking
area is 23 feet wide from the west sidewalk line to the
curb, the sidewalk is 6 feet wide on 13th East. F'rom the
end of the island on 5th South to the east side of the circle
on exhibit P-13 is 60 feet. It is 59 feet straight east from
the circle to the west side of the cross walk. From the "x"
mark on 13th East at the cross walk to the circle is 55 feet
(p·. 213).
Since the map exhibit P-13 is drawn to scale the
court did not permit Mr. Tipton to make any further
measurements of distance on that exhibit.
Exhibit B-14 is a photo of the intersection looking
west and taken from a point 125 feet east of the pedestrian lane. The comparison of this photo with exhibit
P-4 shows they were taken at approximately the same
point. Exhibit D-15 is a photo looking north from the
center of the pedestrian lane on the east side of 13th
East a.t a point in the center of 5th South. F·rom this
point it appears that the w·est side of 13th East is visible
for the entire block to 4th South.
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STATEMENT OF P·OINTS
POINT NO. 1. The court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's evidence
as (a) the evidence failed to establish any actionable
negligence on the part of defendant; (b) the evidence
showed that the sole proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of Seth M. Oberg, Jr., the driver of the
car in which plaintiff was r.iding; (c) the evidence showed
that plaintiff himself was guilty of contributory negligence.
POINT NO. 2.

The court erred in failing to direct a

verdict in favor of defendant as requested, by defendant
in his requested instructions.
POINT NO. 3.

The court erred in refusing to grant

defendant a new trial.
POINT NO. 4.

Instruction No. 14 was erroneous

as a whole and was prejudicial to defendant's rights.
POINT NO. 5.

That part of Instruction No. 14

which permitted the jury to predicate negligence of defendant on a failure to keep his fire truck under proper
control was erroneous and prejudicial to the rights of
the defendant.
POINT N·O. 6.

That part of Instruction No. 14

\vhich permitted the jury to predicate negligence of de-
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fendant on a failure to drive 'vith due regard for the
safety of all persons was erroneous and prejudicial to
the rights of defenda.nt.
POINT NO. 7. That part of Instruction No. 14
which permitted the jury to predicate negligence upon a
failure to reduce his speed as much as necessary for safe
operation of the truck was erroneous and prejudicial to
the rights of defendant.
POINT NO. 8. The failure of the court to g1ve
the jury some basis as a guide in determining where the
truck, as a matter of law, should have slowed down and
what elements are to be considered in determining negligence based upon the failure to slow down as necessary
for the safe operation of the truck constituted error .and
prejudicial to defendant.
POINT NO. 9. That part of Instruction No. 14
which permitted the jury to predicate negligence of defendant upon a failure to keep a proper lookout was erroneous and prejudicial to the rights of defendant.
POINT NO. 10. It 'vas error for the court in not
defining and limiting anywh-ere in its instructions the
grounds of negligence relied upon by plaintiff for a recovery and restricting the right to recover to a finding
that one or more of such grounds of negligence existed in
fact.
POINT NO. 11. It was error for the court to fail
to instruct the jury that defendant having sounded the
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siren and his truck exhibitjng red lights, as required by
lR\v, had in fact co1nplied with the requirement that he
drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using
the streets, and that he could continue into and across
the intersection against the red light unless it should
appear from the evidence that defendant became aware,
or, in the exercise of due care, should have become aware,
of Oberg's failure to yield the right-of-way in time to
have permitted defendant to avoid the collision.
POINT N·O. 12. It 'vas error for the court to fail
to instruct the jury to the effect that if the collision resulted solely from the negligence of Oberg, then defendant would not be liable.
POINT NO. 13. The court erred in admitting in
evidence the opinion of S. S. Taylor as to the speed of
the fire truck in answering hypothetical questions submitted without proper foundation.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CLOSE OF
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE.

The evidence failed to establish any actionable
negligence on the part of defendant.
(a)

In the beginning of our Statement of Fiacts we stated
the four grounds of negligence relied upon by plaintiff in
his complaint and in the pre-trial order. They are (1) ex-
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cessive speed in excess of 35 miles per hour, ( 2) failure to
keep a proper look out, (3) failure to keep the fire truck
under proper control, and (4) failure to exhibit the red
light and sound the siren.
On the first ground the only persons who testified
as to the speed of the truck were Nielson and Jensen.
The former had stopped his car on the east side of 13th
East and Jensen had stopped his car on the west side of
13th East. Both were waiting for the truck to pass and
observed it for a distance of at least one-half block. Nielson said it was going 20 to 30 miles per hour. Jensen said
it was going 30 to 40 miles per hour. S. S. Taylor gave
his opinion, based upon a number of assumptions which
were vvholly without support in the evidence, as to the
speed of the truck as it reached the point where the tire
marks described by Officer Peterson first began. His
opinion varied from 31 to 50 miles per hour. We submit
such evidence does not disclose excessive speed in excess
of 35 miles per hour. Further there is no evidence that
35 miles per hour is the speed limit so that any speed in
excess of that speed would be excessive. Assuming that
the speed limit was 35 miles per hour, there is no proof
that the speed was exceeded by a vvitness testifying the
speed was from 30 to 40 miles p·er hour or 30 to 50 miles
per hour.
Finally, when an emergency vehicle, such as was this
fire truck, is responding to a fire alarn1, the statute, Sec.
41-6-76 U.C.A., enacted by Chapter 65, 1949 Session Laws,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
expressly authorizes a speed in excess of the prirna facie
speed limits. A discussion of the statutes relating to
authorized emergency vehicles will be given later in this
brief. It is also significant to here point out that when
the case was submitted to the jury, nowhere in its instructions did the trial court submit speed in excess of 35 miles
per hour as an element of negligence relied on by plaintiff
or to be considered by the jury. We think the foregoing
is sufficient to show that the plaintiff did not make out
a case on the element of excessive speed.
As to failure to keep a proper look out there is likewise no supporting evidenc-e. Both Farnsworth and Nielson. place the fire truck at the north cross walk across
13th East, as the Oberg car passed the Nielson car, which
was standing east of the east cross walk across 5th S.outh.
As shown by the map, Exhibit P-13, the truck was then
55 feet from the point of i1npact and Oberg's car was 59
feet from the same point. Since Oberg's car was struck
behind the door its front end had actually traveled at
least 6 or 8 feet beyond the point of impact, so the car
really traveled about 65 or 67 feet while the truck was
traveling 55 feet. The evidence shows that the east and
west traffic had heard the siren and seen the fire truck
and was stopped to yield the right of way. The accident
happened because the Oberg car suddenly emerged from
behind the Nielson car into the intersection. There is not
the slightest evidence that the Oberg car was visible at
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a time and place before the accident so as to convict the
defendant of negligence in not discovering it in time to
avoid a collision.
There is likewise no evidence whatever to sustain the
allegation that defendant did not have the truck under
proper control. The evidence is all to the contrary. He
brought the truck to a stop in a straight line according
to Officer Peterson's observations notwithstanding the
tie rod on the right front wheel was broken. The mere
fact that a collision occurred does not establish lack of
control.
Three of plaintiff's witnesses, Farnsworth, Jensen
and Nielson, all testified that the truck had red flasher
lights going and the siren sounding. Jensen saw and
heard this while the truck was three-quarters of a block
north of the intersection, at least 500 feet away. Nielson
saw and heard the truck while it was one-half block away.
It was the siren and the Ted light that attracted their
attention to the truck and caused them to wait for the
truck to pass. Certainly the plaintiff's and Oberg's mere
negative statement that they did not hear the siren or
see the red light raises no issue for the jury in view of
the positive testimony of plaintiff's own witnesses above
referred to. Oberg admitted he saw the red light immediately before the impact so his testimony raises no issue
as to the red light being on. Either they failed to look
or hear, or they heard with unhearing ears and looked
with unseeing eyes, or th·e radio was on and prevented
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them fron1 hearing. The plaintiff said he glanced north
when they were back of Nielson's car but the glance was
so casual he couldn't tell whether the trees in the parking created an obstruction to his view. Oberg says his
view was obstructed by the Nielson car.
We sub1nit the plaintiff failed to establish negligence
on the part of defendant or any of the grounds relied
upon.
(b) The evidence above referred to establishes
that the sole proximate cause of the accident, regardless
of any negligence on the part of defendant in the particulars alleged, was the negligence of Oberg in heedlessly and recklessly driving into the intersection at a time
when the fire truck was plainly visible and had the right
of way and was in such a position that a collision was inevitable. Had Oberg so much as glanced to the north as
he passed Nielson's car, or if he had merely observed the
intersection, assuming he could not have seen anything
before, he could have seen the fire truck entering the intersection for it was at that point at that time according
to F-arnsworth and Nielson, and there is no dispute on
that point. Oberg says he was going 20 miles per hour.
He had to travel over 60 feet to get to the point of impact. Certainly he could ha-\ e stopped or slowed down so
as to permit the truck to pasf•. We think the situation here
is similar to that in Ha.a1stritch v. O.S.L.R.R. Co., 70
Utah 552, 262 P. 100, where t twas held that the sole proxinlate cause of the collision between the car in which plain-
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tiff was riding as a guest and the railroad car being
pushed across the street, regardless of negligence on the
part of the railroad, was the driver's negligence in failing to see and heed that which was plainly visible.
(c) Plaintiff admitted tha.t he looked north and saw
and heard nothing. At that time, according to Nielson
and Farnsworth, the fire truck was at the north cross
walk across 13th East. The fire siren was sounding and
the red lights were flashing. A person cannot be heard
to say that he didn't see that which was plainly visible
before him or did not hear that which was clearly audible
in his position. "The duty to look has inherent in it the
duty to see what is there to be seen and pay heed to it."
Mungus v. Olsson, ______ Ut. ______ , 201 P. 2d 495. As stated in
Brown v. Lilli, 281 Mich. 170, 274 N.W. 751, where plaintiff testified she looked and saw nothing. "If she looked
and failed to see that which was plainly visible·, she will
be held in point of law to have seen it."
Being held in law as having seen the fire truck since
it was there plainly visible before him, plaintiff had a
duty to warn Oberg or do something to avoid the collision.
He did nothing. We submit his negligence should prevent
him from a recovery in this action.
POINT NO. 2. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
DIRE,CT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT IN HIS REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.

Defendant, in his first requested instruction asked
the court to direct a verdict in his favor of no cause of
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action, (p. 225) and took exception to the court's refusal
to give it (p. 219). All that has been said under Point
No.1 is applicable here. In addition we have the evidence
submitted by defendant and his witnesses. The speed of
the truck as it approached the intersection is definitely
fixed as being not in excess of 35 miles per hour by all
four firemen. The evidence is likewise definite that the
speed of the truck was reduced from 40 to 45 miles per
hour down to 25 to 35 miles per hour, when about 125
feet north of the cross walk. While it is true Jensen and
Nielson testified they did not notice a reduction or acceleration in speed, this would constitute no conflict with
the definite evidence of the four firemen.
On the question of keeping a proper look out, defendant's testimony shows he saw the Nielson and Jensen
cars stopped and waiting, and then proceeded on through
the intersection watching the traffic ahead, since he had
the right of way. The fact that he did not see the Oberg
car as he came close to and into the intersection does not
convict him of failing to keep a proper look out. When
he was proceeding with the siren sounding and the red
lights flashing and on an emergency call, he had a right
to assume that all persons using the street would yield
the right of way, until it should reasonably appear that
the right of way was not being yielded. When the Oberg
car first became visible to Halladay and Wells, who were
looking easterly, it was then so close and coming at such
speed that a collision \Vas inevitable. There is no other
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evidence as to when the Oberg car became visible, and no
evidence that it was discoverable sooner by keeping a reasonable look out.
The defendant's evidence makes it clear and without
dispute that he had the truck under proper control as he
ap·pToached and entered the intersection and even after
the impact. He had slowed down so he could have stopped
at the interse.ction when it appeared to him that the
traffic, east and west, was stopped and yielding him
the right of way. He then accelerated his speed and entered the intersection. The impact broke the right tie rod
but even this did not throw the truck out of control. He
brought it to a stop in a straight line. There is no evidence to the contrary. The other three firemen confirmed
the point. There is a total absence of any evidence showing a lack of p,rop,er control.
As to Plaintiff's allegation that the defendant did
not sound a siren and did not exhibit a red light, the
court on its own motion instructed the jury it must consider that the law had been complied with in that regard.
So that element is eliminated from the case.
Since there was a failure of proof as to each of the
grounds of negligence relied on for recovery, we submit
the court should have directed the jury to bring in a verdict of no cause of action.
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POINT NO. 3. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL.

Defendant seasonably filed a motion for a new trial
or for judgment non obstante veredicto (p. 253). In this
1notion defendant specifically and separately assigned as
error and presented to the trial court for consideration
each and all the points heretofore stated and relied on
for reversal in this appeal. Since all these points will be
argued hereafter, we refer the court

th~reto

to avoid

repetition. We earnestly contend the court should have
granted a new trial or have entered judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict.
POINTS NOS. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, AND 10, ALL RELATING
TO ERROR IN INSTRUCTION NO. 14.

Instruction No. 14 as given by the court reads as
follows:
"The traffic laws of Utah give to the driver
of a fire truck, ansvvering an alarm, certain privileges not enjoyed by drivers of ordinary vehicles.
These privileges include the right to proceed past
a red light without stopping, but the law specifically provides that the fireman can do so, only
after slowing down as much as may be necessary
for safe operation of the fire truck. It is also provided by law that, in using such a privilege, the
fireman shall not be relieved of the duty to drive
with due regard for the safety of all persons.
"It is admitted in this case that the defendant
proceeded past the red light on 13th East Street.
You must determine if he used this privilege prop-
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erly, by reducing his speed as n1uch as may have
been necessary for safe operation of the fire truck,
and by driving with due regard for the safety of
all persons.
"If you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant negligently failed to reduce liis speed as much as was necessary for safe
operation of the truck, or negligently failed to
keep the truck under proper control, or negligently
failed to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles
in or approaching the intersection, and that such
failures, or any of them, proximately caused the
accident and injuries to the plaintiff, your verdict
must be for the plaintiff and against the defendant."
The defendant excepted to the instruction as a whole
and to the various specific parts as are covered by points
5, 6, 7' & 9 (p. 219).
In Instruction No. 13 the jury were told that reasonable minds could not differ on the proposition that the
fire truck was responding to an emergency call; that it
was equipped with red lights visible for a distance of 500
feet in front of the truck; and· that the siren was being
sounded prior to and at the time of collision; and so the
jury must find these elements as being established.
Originally, it was held by this court in Roll.ow v. Ogden City, 66 Utah 475, 243 P. 791, that the statutes and
ordinances regulating speed of vehicles on the public
streets and highways had no application to a fire department vehicle.
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In Chapter 52 Page 116, Section 5, Laws of 1941, the
legislature made all vehicles of the state and its subdivisions subject to the provisions of the act regulating traffic, subject to exceptions as are set out in the act with
reference to emergency vehicles. Under this section an
emergency vehicle was required to slow down upon approaching a red or stop signal "as necessary for safety
but may proceed cautiously past such red or stop sign
or signal."
Section 41 provides as follows:
"The prima facie speed limitations set forth
in this act shall not apply to authorized emergency
vehicles when responding to emergency calls and
the drivers thereof sound audible signal by bell,
siren, or exhaust whistle. This provision shall
not relieve the driver of any authorized emergency
vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard
for the safety of all persons using th·e, street, nor
shall it protect the driver of any such vehicle from
the consequence of a reckless disregard of the
safety of others."
Section 63 provided :
"(a) Upon the immediate approach of an
authorized emergency vehicle, when the driver is
giving audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle,
or bell, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield
the right-of-way and shall immediately drive to a
position parallel to, and as close as possible to,
the right-hand edge or curb of the highway clear
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of any intersection and shall stop and remain in
such position until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed
by a police officer.
(b) This section shall not operate to relieve
the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle
from the duty to drive with due regard for the
safety of all p,ersons using the highway."
These sections were carried into U.C.A. 1943 as sections 57-7-82, 57-7-118 and 57-7-140, respectively. In 1949,
Chapter 65, the legislature amended sections 57-7-82 and
57-7-140 and repealed section 57-7-118. Section 57-7-82,
as amended, incorporated the subject matter of exceeding
the prima facie speed limits theretofore contained in section 57-7-118, U.C.A. 1943. S.ection 57-7-140, U.C.A. 1943,
was amended to provide for displaying a red light visible
500 feet in front of the vehicle as an additional requirelnent to that of sounding the siren. Sections 57-7-82 and
57-7-140, as so amended in 1949, were carried in U.C.A.
1953 as sections 41-6-14 and 41-6-76. We quote these sections:
"57 -7-82. (a) The provisions of this act applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles
owned or operated by the United States, this state
or any county, city, town, district, or any other
political subdivision of the state, except as provided in this section and subject to such specific
exceptions as are set forth in this act with reference to authorized emergency vehicles.
(b) The driver of an authorized emergency
vehicle, when responding to an emerg~ncy call
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or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected
violator of the law or when responding to but not
upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise
the privileges set forth in this section, but subject
to the conditions herein stated.
(c) The driver of an authorized emergency
vehicle may:
1. Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this act;
2. Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop
sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation;
3. Exceed the prima facie speed limits so
long as he does not endanger life or property;
4. Disregard regulations governing direction
of movement or turning in specific directions.
(d) The exemptions herein granted to an
authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only
when the driver of any said vehicle while in motion
sounds audible signal by bell, siren or exhaust
whistle as may be reasonably necessary, and when
the vehicle is equipped with at least one lighted
lamp displaying a red light visible under normal
atmospheric conditions from a distance of 500 feet
to the front of such vehicle, except tha.t an authorized ernergency vehicle operated as a police
vehicle need not be equipped with or display a red
light visible from in front of the vehicle.
(e) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorir.ed emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for
the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions
protect the driver from the consequences of his
reckless disregard for the safety of others.
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(f) The p,rovisions of this act shall not apply
to persons, teams, motor vehicles and other equipment while actually engaged in work upon the surface of a highway, but shall apply to such persons
and vehicles when traveling to or from such work."
"57-7-140. (a) Upon the immediate approach
of an authorized emergency vehicle equipped with
at least one lighted lamp exhibiting red light visible under normal atmospheric conditions froru a
distance of 500 feet to the front of such vehicle and
when the driver is giving audible signal by siren,
exhaust whistle or bell, the driver of every other
vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and shall immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as
close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of
the highway, clear of any intersection and shall
stop and remain in such position until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when
otherwise directed by a police officer.
(b) This section shall not operate to relieve
the driver of any authorized emergency vehicle
from the duty to drive with due regard for the
safety of all person~ using the highway."
It will be noticed that in the 1949 laws that part of
Section 5 of 1941 laws, permitting an emergency vehicle
to proceed cautiously past a red light or stop sign was
eliminated. On the matter of exceeding the prima facie
speed liinit the 1949 law, section 57-7-82 (c) (3) added
the words "so long as he does not endanger life or property."
Since we challenge Instruction No. 14 as a whole 1
and also its several p,arts, an interpretation of the stat-
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utes above quoted is i1nperative. We think the following
authorities lay down the proper criteria by which the
rights and duties of defendant in this case should be
determined. The leading case, one which is frequently
cited, is Balthaser v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 167 Cal. 302,
202 P. 37, 18 A.L.R. 452.
In this case a fire truck responded to a call and cut
the corner at an intersecting street and ran into defendant's train, killing one fireman and injuring another.
The City of Pasadena paid compensation and brought
suit to recover over again against the Railway Co. The
statutes required that all vehicles in 1naking a turn on
intersecting streets to make the turn by the center of the
intersection and also provided that no person should operate a motor vehicle in excess of 15 miles per hour in
approaching or going around corners or in approaching
or traversing intersecting highways. The statute also
provided:
"Police patrol v;agons, police ambulances, fire
patrols, fire engines and fire apparatus in all
cases while being opera ted as such, shall have
the right of way with due regard to the safety of
the public; but this provision shall not protect
the driver or operator of any such vehicle or his
employer or principal from the consequence of
the arbitrary exercise of this right or for injuries
wilfully inflicted."
It was held that while the language of the statute was
broad enough to apply to fire trucks in fixing speed
limits, it must be construed as excluding such vehicles.
The court says :
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"It follows that the general rules of the road
relating to speed and to the turning of corners contained in the Motor Vehicle Act do not apply to
fire or police apparatus. We have only to consider the utter absurdity of requiring peace officers to observe the arbitrary speed limits fixed by
the Motor Vehicle Act when pursuing criminals,
who may be fleeing in high-power cars at twice
the legal limit, to make manifest that the legislature did not have in view such a limitation on
peace officers. And it is equally clear that they
did not contemplate retarding the speed of fire
apparatus in going to a fire."
In construing the language "due regard to the safety
of the public," the court says:
"It is evident that the right of way of fire
appa~atus over other vehicles is dependent upon
'due regard to the safety of the public' only in
so far as such 'due regard' affects the person required to yield the rjght of way. Notice to the person required to yield the right of way is essential,
and a reasonable opportunity to stop or otherwise
yield the right of way necessary in order to charge
a person with the obligation fixed by law to give
precedence to the fire apparatus."

Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 876, 75 I).
2d 599. Plaintiff was a guest passenger in an automobile
being driven across the street intersection on the right
side of the street, at a lawful rate of speed, in response
to a mechanical "Go" signal. A police automobile operated upon authorized emergency business, traveling at a
high rate of speed and disregarding the traffic "Stop"
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signal, crashed into the automobile. The statute made
the City liable for the negligent operation of its vehicles,
even though in a governmental capacity. The court cites
and relies upon the Balthaser Case. Since the decision
of that case, the statute has been amended to provide that
the provisions regulating the speed of vehicles shall not
apply to authorized emergency vehicles, with the proviso
that the section should not relieve the driver "from the
duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway, nor shall it protect the driver
of any such vehicle from the consequence of an arbitrary
exercise of the privileges declared in this section."
The court savs:
•i

""The expression ''vith due regard for the
safety' of all persons using the highway was explained in the Balthasar Case, where the court
said, 187 Cal. 302, at page 311, 202 p. 37, 41, 19
.A.. L.R. 452; 'It is evident that the right of way of
fire apparatus over other vehicles is dependent upon 'due regard to the safety of the public only in
so far as such 'due regard' affects the person required to yield the right of way. Notice to the person required to yield the right of way is essential,
and a reasonable opportunity to stop or otherwise
yield the right of 'vay necessary in order to charge
a person with the obligation fixed by law to give
precedence to the fire apparatus.' This is the only
reasonable interpretation that the statute will
bear. If the driver of a.n emergency vehicle is a,t
all times required to drirue with dne regar·d for the
safety of the p;ublic as all other drivers are required to do, then all the provisions of these statntes rela,ting to ernergency vehicles become mean-
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ingless and. no privileges a,re gra,nted to then1. Bnt
if his 'due regard' for the safety of others means
that he should, by su.itable warning, give othe:rs
a reasonable opportunity to yield the right of way,
the statutes become workable for the purpos.e:s intended. (Italics added.)
"The expression 'arbitrary exercise of the privileges' has also caused some confusion. Since the
vehicles are excluded from the restrictions of
speed and right of way, negligence cannot be predicated on those elements if proper warning has
been given. These are among the 'privileges'
which are granted by the statutes. An arbitrary
exercise of them may rest upon the question
whether an emergency in fact existed. The statute
has determined this question in part by the limitation in section 120 to cases where the emergency
vehicle is engaged in the chase of violators of the
law or in response to a fire alarm. Members of
the fire and police departments are relieved from
civil liability when 'responding to an alar1n of fire
or an emergency police call.' Thus, if such avehicle is being operated in response to a fire alarm,
excessive speed alone is not an arbitrary exercise
of them.
"Some confusion has also arisen over the
use of the expression in section 132 and similar
statutes requiring the operators of these vehicles
'to sound audible signal by siren.' Section 554 of
the Vehicle Code, St. 1935, p. 187, has clarified this
somewhat by using the language: 'Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency
vehicle giving audible signal by siren.' It will be
noted· that it is the sounding or the giving of audible signal that fixes the right of way and relieves
the driver of negligence. Where there is dispute
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as to whether the party injured heard the signal,
it is a question of fact to be determined by the jury,
but only in so far as that is material to the issue
of his contributory negligence. The statutes are
clear that when an audible signal is given the opera tor of the emergency vehicle has a clear right
of way. The giving of the signal is the measure
of care on his part, and if this is done his duty
of care is performed, subject to the limitation as
to 'arbitrary' conduct as hereinbefore noted.
'0ur conclusions from the foregoing are that
when the operator of an emergency vehicle responding to an emergency call gives the statutory
notice of his approach the employer is not liable
for injuries to another, unless the operator has
made an arbitrary exercise of these privileges.
In such cases speed, right of way, and all other
'rules of the road' are out of the picture; the only
questions of fact, in so far as the public owner is
concerned, are first, whether there was an emergency call within the terms of the statute; and
third, whether there was an arbitrary exercise of
these privileges. Here the en1ergency was conceded, the sounding of the siren was proved by the
only substantial evidence offered, and an arbitrary exercise of the privileges has not been
shown."
4

Ra;ynor v. City of Arcata, 11 Cal. 2d 113, 77 P. 2d
1054. l~laintiff was injured when his automobile was
struck by an automobile of the defendant City which was
operated by the Fire Chief in response to an alarm. Plaintiff was driving on a through street with the traffic heavy
on both sides of the highway. He entered the intersection
in second gear at about 20 Iniles per hour. He charged
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the Fire Chief drove at an excessive speed; that he failed
to stop or slacken his speed at the stop sign; that he did
not have a proper or efficient siren or did not sound a
siren or signal with sufficient distinctness to be heard.
Plaintiff himself and the driver of the car immediately
following, testified they heard no siren. The court
says the vital issue in this case was whether the Fire
Chief sounded his 'varning siren as he proceeded at a
high rate of speed in response to a fire alarm. The court
refers to the Lucas case and says:
"A warning siren having been sounded, negligence of the driver could not be predicated on his
rate of speed or failure to obey the 'stop' sign. An
authorized emergency vehicle responding to an
emergency call is exempt from limitations of speed
and other rules of the road, such as those relating
to the right of 'yay. The exemption from speed
limits and right of way is statutory. Sections
120 and 132, Motor Vehicle Act, St. 1923, pp. 556,
560, as amended by St. 1929, pp. 539, 542; now sections 517 and 554, Vehicle Code, St. 1935, pp. 178,
187. The exemption from other rules of the road
has been established by judicial decisions, notably
by Balthasar v. Pacific Electric Ry., 187 Cal. 302,
202 P. 37, 19 A.L.R. 452.
"The provisions in sections 120 and 132, supra,
to the effect that the exemptions there given shall
not relieve the driver of an emergency vehicle of
the duty to drive with due regard to the safety of
the public, means that the driver must, 'by suitable
warning, give others a reasonable opportunity to
yield the right of way.' Lucas v. City of Los
Angeles, Cal. Sup., 75 P. 2d 599, 603. The sections
also provide that the exemption shall not protect
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the driver from 'an arbitrary exercise' of the privileges there granted. But an arbitrary exercise
of said privileges cannot be predicated upon the
elements of speed and failure to observe other
rules o£ the road where a warning has been given.
'In such cases speed, right of way, and all other
'rules of the road' are out of the picture.' 75 P.
2d 599, 605.
"In the instant case the evidence as to whether
a warning signal was given was in conflict. The
vice of the instructions given to the jury is that
they authorize the jury to predicate a finding of
negligence on the fire chief's speed and failure to
observe the boulevard stop even though the jury
conclude upon the conflicting evidence that a
sufficient warning signal had in fact been given.
The effect of the instructions was to authorize
the jury to determine as a 1natter of fact whether
in traveling at the rate of speed shown and in failing to observe the boulevard stop the Fire Chief
had driven 'with due regard for the safety of all
persons using the highway' or had been guilty of
an 'arbitrary exercise' 'of the privileges accorded
e1nergency vehicles."
R·eed L:. Sintpson, 32 Cal. 2d ±±4, 196 P. 2d 895. This
is an action brought by the surviving widow and children
of J'ohn Reed, a highway patrol officer, for death which
occurred when the motorcycle he was riding collided with
defendant's auto1nobile. The trial resulted in a verdict

for defendant and the appeal is on the instructions of
the court. The officer noticjng a car in front of him weaving in an err a tic manner over the center line decided to
apprehend the driver. The traffic was heavy, moving
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about 35 miles an hour. The defendant who was driving
in an opposite direction from the officer decided to turn
to the left in the middle of the block. He stopp·ed to let
some cars pass him, giving the left turn signal and drove
in front of the officer's n1otorcycle resulting in a collision. The Trial Court instructed the jury that the evidence showed that the officer did not sound his siren at
all and therefore he was not entitled to the exe1nption
accorded emergency vehicles. The statute provided that
"said exemption shall apply only when the driver of said
vehicle sounds a siren as may be reasonably necessary as
a warning to others." The court held that absence of the
warning siren did not as a matter of law take the officer
out of the exemption as the words "as may he reasonably
necessary" indicates that there is some discretion on the
part of the officer whether conditions required the sounding of the siren. The court reaffirms the Lucas and
Raynor cases and says:
"Defendants argue evidentiary considerations
th~t would establish contributory negligence on
the part of the decedent in bar of plaintiffs' recovery of damages -that if he was traveling at
60 miles an hour on the boulevard, as some witnesses testified, his excessive speed coupled with
his neglect to sound his siren contributed proximately to cause the accident; and, on the other
hand_, if he was proceeding at 35 miles an hour,
as other testimony indicates, his failure to keep on
the lookout and avoid the dangers of traffic, which
was concededly heavy at the time, contributed
proximately to the fatal condition. But since in
the p·erformance of his official duty, the decedent
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was exen1pted from the restrictions of 'speed right
of \vay,' and all other 'rules of the road', his lack
of due care cannot be predicated on those elements
if the 'reasonably necessary' warning contemplated by the statute was given. Lucas v. City of Los
Angeles, supra, 10 Cal. 2d 476, 486, 75 P. 2d 599;
see, also, Isaacs v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 73 Cal. App. 2d 621, 626, 167 P. 2d
221. Of course, if the decedent's conduct were
found to be an 'arbitrary exercise of (his traffic)
privileges' as where 'such driver' has given a
'reasonably necessary' warning but sees that it has
not been observed or heeded, and having opportunity to stop, he nevertheless continues on into
an inevitable collision- he would not be relieved
from his negligence because the issue would then
be akin to that 'involved under the last clear
chance doctrine.' "

State of Wa.shington v. United States, 194 F. 2d 38.
The United States maintained a fire department at its
barracks near V ancouv.er, Washington and had an arrangement with the City for n1utual assistance in case
of a fire alarm. While the federal fire truck was enroute
to the city fire station it collided with the vehicle which
a state patrolman was driving. The patroln1an was not
on any e1nergency mission. The State of Washington
brought an action for damages to the vehicle and for the
injuries sustained by the patrolman under theW orkmen's
Compensation Law. The collision occurred at the intersection, the pa trohnan being on an arterial street and
the fire truck entered the same without stopping. The
eollision occurred near the center of the intersection when
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the fire truck struck the left rear portion of the car driven
by the patrolman. The patrohnan did not hear the government fire truck in time to avoid it and did not yield
the right of way. The driver of the fire truck reduced
its speed to approximately 25 miles an hour with the
siren sounding and red lights flashing. The state statute
provided that the laws applicable to the operation of vehicles upon the public highways should not apply to "any
emergency vehicle properly equipped as required by la"\\y
and actually responding to an emergency call; provided,
that the provisions of this section shall not relieve the
operator of an authorized emergency vehicle of the duty
to operate with due regard for the safety of all persons
using the public highway nor shall it protect the operator
of any such emergency vehicle from the consequence of a
reckless disregard for the safety of others.
It was contended that not withstanding the exemption of the fire truck from the statutory duty to stop before entering the aterial street, the driver of the truck
should have looked out for and avoided striking the patrol
car. The court says:
"In the case of Balthasar v. Pacific Electric
R.y. Co., 187 Cal. 302, 202 P. 37, 41, 19 A.L.R. 452,
the Supreme Court of California had under consideration a statute which gave the right of way
to fire department apparatus and other emergency vehicles while being operated as such 'with
due regard to the safety of the public.' The California Court construed the 'due regard to the
safety of the public' limitation upon the exercise
of the right of way granted to emergency vehicles
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
to mean only that the driver of the favored vehicle
should give other users of the highway proper and
adequate notice of its approach and thus afford
those required to yield the right of way a reasonable opportunity to do so. The rule of the Balthasar case has been followed later in many California cases."
"It is in the public interest that an emergency
vehicle reach its destination and accomplish its
Inission as expeditiously as possible and, for that
reason, it is given s,tatutory exemption from
traffic regulations. The driver of the vehicle has
the right to assume that, if he gives adequate warning of the approach, others will yield him the
right of way and will take into account the fact
that his speed is not subject to the usual limitations. The exercise, in the public interest, of his
special privileges as to speed and right of way
is not consistent with due regard for the safety
of others in the ordinary sense. If, as the California Courts have pointed out, he is to be required to drive with due regard for the safety of
other users of the highway, the san1e as unexempt
drivers are required to do, then the exemption
granted to him by the statutes 'vould be Ineaningless.
"In the present case, the driver of the Government fire truck continuously sounded a siren
and flashed red warning lights. He thus gave
adequate and proper notice of the approach of an
emergency vehicle and, we think, operated his vehicle with due regard for the safety of other users
on the city streets."

Baltimore Transit Co. v. Young, 189 Md. 428, 56 A.
2d 140. Miss Young wa~ riding in her automobile which
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was being driven by Pitts. They had been to the hotel
for supper and were driving ho1ne when they reached
Howard Street. The traffic light was green and they
proceed across the intersection oblivious of the northbound trouble truck of the Transit Company. Under the
state law the trouble truck was an emergency vehicle
and granted the right-of-way as such under the statute
which provided that :
"Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle, when the driver is giving
audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle, or bell,
the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the
right of way and shall immediately drive to a
position parallel to, and as close as possible to,
the right-hand edge or some curb of the highway
clear of any intersection and shall stop and remain in such position until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise
directed by a police officer."
Another statute provided that the exemption from
the speed and other traffic regulations shall not relieve
the driver from the duty "to drive with due. regard for
the safety of all persons using the street," and shall not
protect him from the consequence of a "reckless disregard for the safety of others."
Another act provided that "an emergency vehicle
approaching a red or stop signal shall slow down as necessary for safety and may proceed cautiously past such
red or stop signal or stop sign."
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Another section provided that the prima facie speed
limitations and provisions relative to right of way, stopping at through highways, rules of the road, traffic control devices and signals set forth in this article shall not
apply to authorized emergency vehicles when responding
to emergency calls and the drivers thereof sound audible
signal by bell, siren, and exhaust whistle.
"Thus, although, the driver of an emergency
vehicle is ordinarily not limited in speed, and is
authorized to drive with caution past a red light,
he may nevertheless, be held liable for damages if
in the exercise of his special privileges, he fails
to give audible warning of his approach and pays
no attention whatever to traffic on an intersecting
street. Evidence that the driver of such a vehicle
drove nt high speed past a r': i light at a busy
intersection, without giving due \Varning to traffic
on the intersecting street, warrants a finding that
the vehicle was being opera ted with 'a reckless
disregard for the safety of others.' On the other
hand, the driver of such a vehicle cannot be expected to use the same care that the law requires
of the ordinary motorist who has no emergency
duty to perform. To stop at every slight indication of danger might often be a failure of duty in
the past of the emergency driver. On many occasions his prompt and fearless action is ilnperatively necessary to prevent loss of property or loss
of life, or both, or even widespread disaster."
The driver of the trouble truck testified that he was
going about 20 rniles an hour and slowed down when he
approached the intersection; that he looked to the right
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for west bound traffic, but believing the way was clear
he increased his speed to over 20 miles an hour. Suddenly plaintiff's car appeared before him about 10 feet
away. His companion testified that the red light on the
truck kept flashing from the time he turned it on and
that he blew the siren from the next street below. ThP
driver of the car immediately behind the plaintiff's car
testified he sa\\T the truck coming with the siren going full
blast and the red light flashing. Two other witnesses
testified they heard the siren. Goldberg, a taxicab driver,
testified that he heard the siren only for a short distance
before the truck reached the intersection. Pitts did not
hear the siren. He testified that when they reached
Howard Street, and had the green light, the car in front
of him turned north and he started to cross and was
knocked completely out. "In other words, when the slowly
moving car ahead of him turned into Howard Street, he
kept straight ahead and drove directly in front of the
emergency truck with its siren screaming and its warning light flashing."
"Plaintiff also called attention to Goldberg's
testimony that the siren was not sounded the entire distance from Fayette to Lexington Street,
but only about a half block starting at the alley
south of the May Co1npany's store. Goldberg's
testimony shows no negligence on the part of the
Baltimore Transit Company or its servants. Of
course to impose upon a traveler on a highway
the duty of giving the right of way to an authoriz·ed emergency vehicle, notice to him must be
given of its approach so that he has a reasonable
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opportunity to stop or otherwise yield the right
of way. Balthasar v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 187
Cal. 302, 202 P. 37, 19 A.L.R·. 452, 458. In the instant case, however, it was shown that the siren
was heard plainly by other automobile drivers in
the vicinity. Undoubtedly, Pitts, by th'e exercise
of ordinary care and caution, could easily have
heard the siren in sufficient time to yield the right
of way to the emergency vehicle, and thus could
have avoided the collision. Moreover, as th.ere
was no rain or fog to obscure his vision, he could
easily have seen the flashing light.
"Pitts and plaintiff testified that they did not
hear the siren and did not see the flashing light.
But we accept the rule that when a witness testifies that he did not see or hear a certain object
which, if he had actually looked and listened, he
must necessarily have seen and heard, his testiInony is not worthy of consideration."
"In the case before us there is no substantial
conflict in the evidence as to material facts. Plaintiff did not meet the burden of establishing some
negligent act, or omission of defendant assuming
the truth of all the evidence on behalf of plaintiff, yet no ground vvas shown for recovery. Therefore the judgment for plaintiff rnust be reversed."
Reversed without a new trial.

Willia1ns v. City of P,ittsburgh, 349 Pa. 430, 37 A.
2d 540. Plaintiff was injured when his n1otorcycle and a
fire truck collided at an intersection. The signal light
'vas green for plaintiff and red for the fire truck. The
fire truck was traveling frorn 40 to 45 miles an hour.
The plaintiff alleged that no bell or siren was sounded. A
verdict was found for the plaintiff, but the court gave de-
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fendant judgment notvfithstanding the verdict. The negligence claimed was ( 1) the speed of the fire truck, ( 2)
its running through a red light, and (3) the failure to
give warning of its approach. The statute provided that
speed limitation applicable to other vehicles should not
apply to those of the fire department traveling in response to a fire alarm if "operated with due regard for
safety" and not with "a reckless disregard of safety of
others." It was also provided that the ordinary rules
with respect to signal light at intersections were not applicable to fire department vehicles. Plaintiff testified
no bell or siren was sounded, but if there had been he
would have been able to hear it.
A witness for plaintiff who was driving a truck four
or five truck lengths to the rear of plaintiff said he did
not hear any siren or bell until the fire truck got into the
intersection. He heard it ihen. Opposing this testimony
the acting captain on the fire truck testified he rang the
bell and with his foot operated the electrical siren. The
driver said the bell and siren were both being sounded.
Three other witnesses testified to the same effeet - two
of them being school boys who had heard the siren and
turned around to watch. The third was a newspaper
route man wlio heard the siren. The court says:
"Negative testi1nony of a plaintiff and his
witnesses that they did not hear any whistle or
bell of an approaching vehicle is sufficient to go
to the jury if the defendant produces no evidence
to the contrary, but if there is positive testimony
of witnesses that they did hear such a warning
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given, the negative testimony is insufficient to
make out a charge of negligence.
"'An analysis of the evidence in the present
case indicates that it does not measure up to the
required ,standard. The testimony of plaintiff's
witness was wholly negative in character, and
plaintiff's own testimony, although expressed in
more affirmative terms, was not buttressed by any
state1nent to the effect that as he drove his motorcycle along Bayard Street he was consciously listening for "\Varnings from traffic approaching
frorn the intersecting street; for all that appears,
his failure to hear vvhat so 1nany others heard may
have been due to 1nental pre-occupation or inattention. In view of this fact, in view of the positive testimony of five witnesses on behalf of defendant that the bell was rung and the siren
sounded, and in view of the testimony of plaintiff's O\Vn witness that he heard the siren at least
as the fire truck came into the intersection, no
verdict for plaintiff could be sustained on his mere
assertion that no audible warning was given. The
action of the court below in granting judgment for
defendant n. o. v. was therefore proper."
We shall now proceed to a consideration of the specific points relied on.
(a) Points nu1nbers 4 and 10. Instruction No. 14
was erroneous as a whole. First, under the authorities
cited above, this instruction should not have been given
at all in view of the court's Instruction No. 13, in which
the jury were told that the truck proceeded with red
lights displayed and a siren sounding, according to law.
lTnder the authorities above cited such an instruction
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is inconsistent with giving of Instruction No. 1-!. !-laving
so found, under the facts of this case, that should have
been the end of the matter, for clearly there was no evidence of a reckless disregard for the safety of others.
Second, the. instruction as a whole is ambiguous and
confusing. In the first paragraph the court states the
law to be that a fireman n1ay go through a red light only
after slowing down as may be necessary for the safe operation of the fire truck and is not relieved of the duty
to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons.
Then the jury were told that they must determine whether
this privilege was used properly by defendant reducing
his speed as much as may have been necessary for the
safe operation of the fire truck and by driving with due
regard for the safety of all persons.
In the last paragraph they are told to find for plaintiff, if they find defendant :negligently failed to reduce his
speed as much as was necessary for the safe operation
of the truck, or negligently failed to keep the truck under
proper control, or negligently failed to keep a proper
lookout for other vehicles in or approaching the intersection. In this last part nothing is said about driving
with due regard for the safety of all persons, even though
the jury was previously told they must determine that
point. Undoubtedly, under such· an instruction the jury
would feel free to find for plaintiff on the ground that
defendant had not driven "\vith due regard for the safety
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of others without regard to any findings they may ha.ve
made as to the three grounds that were submitted to
the1n in the last paragraph of the instruction.
Furthermore, the duty to drive with due regard for
the safety of other persons is fully and completely discharged, under the authorities cited, by the sounding
of the siren and the displaying of a red light, which factors are admitted in Instruction No. 13.
Third, under the language of the last paragraph of
Instruction No. 14, the jury were at liberty to consider
defendant's driving in the same light and with no more
protection to hin1 than if he had not been driving an emergency vehicle. By this language it is assumed that the
defendant was in the same position as the driver of an
ordinary vehicle. Nowhere in the statute is any thing
said about proper control or proper lookout. If those factors are here involved they must be deemed a part of the
general li1nitation of driving with due regard for the
safety of others, and the instruction should have clarified
that point.
Fourth, Instruction No. 1-! is the only instruction
purporting to state the grounds relied upon by plaintiff
for a recovery. But the jury were no-vvhere instructed
as to what items of negligence they "'. ere limited to in
detern1ining whether defendant was liable, unless it be·
assuined that because the instruction directed a recovery
if the jury found defendant guilty of all or either of the
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three stated items of negligence, that constituted a lilnitation. No such assumption is warranted as the jury \vas
also told to find whether defendant drove without regard
for the safety of all persons, and further, under the general language of Instruction No. 10, the jury were told
that if defendant was negligent, without defining or lin1iting the items of negligence, plaintiff would be entitled
to recover unless he was guilty of contributory negligence.
Instruction No. 10 does not limit the jury to the items
stated in Instruction No. 14, nor does the latter say that
the items there stated are the only items of negligence
before the jury. Instruction No. 10, as a mere statement
of law, is no doubt correct, but without a restriction any
where, and especially in No. 14, as to the specific items
of negligence involved, the jury were left to find defendant guilty of negligence upon any ground of negligence the jury might find existed.
It is well here to point out again that nowhere did
the court submit to the jury the question as to whether
defendant drove at an excessive rate of speed, and yet
the jury might have concluded that defendant was driving
at an excessive rate of speed since the items of negligence
were not defined or limited in the instructions. The
court must have concluded that the element was not involved notwithstanding the pleadings and the pre-trial
order. So that under the statutes above quoted we have
as the only limitation upon defendant's driving into the
intersection against the red light that he slow down as
necessa.ry for the safe operation of the truck and that he
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drive with due regard for the safety of all others and
not in reckless disregard thereof and as to both of which
the evidence shows he fully complied.
(b) POINT NO. 5. FAILURE TO KEEP THE FIRE
TRUCK UNDER PROPER CONTROL.

In Instruction No. 14 the court submitted to the jury
\vhether defendant negligently failed to keep his truck
under proper control. There is not the slightest evidence
anywhere in the record of lack of proper control, as we
have heretofore pointed out under Points Nos. 1 and 2.
The 1nere happening of a collision is no evidence of lack of
control. The fact that defendant did not see the Oberg
car until just before the impact is no evidence of lack
of control. The fact that he brought the truck to a stop
in a straight line notwithstanding the right tie rod was
broken and the steering mechanism was thereby damaged
is conclusive proof that he had the truck under proper
control. Furthermore, he testified he could have stopped
at the north cross \valk if the traffic had not stopped
for him. The effect of submitting this issue to the jury
\Vas to let them speculate, without any evidence, that defendant failed to have the truck under control, or to infer that element fro1n the Inere happening of the accident.
This was clearly erroneous and prejudicial.
POINT 6. FAILURE TO DRIVE WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF ALL PERSONS.
(c)

The authorities heretofore cited clearly demonstrate
that there was no evidence upon which the court could be
justified in submitting this issue to the jury. Having dis-
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played the red lights and having sol:tnded the siren the
defendant had fully complied with the reqnire1nent to
drive with due regard for the safety of others. Instructing the jury to make a finding on this issue "Tas erroneous
and prejudicial.
(d) POINTS NO. 7 and 8. FAILURE TO REDUCE
SPEED AS NE~CESSARY FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF
THE TRUCK.

In the first place the evidence of the four fire1nan
was that the speed of the truck was reduced from 40 to
45 miles per hour to about 25 miles per hour as defendant
approached the intersection. It then appeared that the
traffic had heard and heeded his approaching warnings,
for a car was stopped on the west side and another on the
east side of the intersection waiting for him to pass.
Neither the testimony of Jensen that it was not apparent
that the truck slowed down and that it seemed like it came
on at the same rate, nor that of F'arnsworth that he did
not notice or recall that the speed was reduced, is suff~
c1ent to raise a conflict against the fireman's testimony.
But aside from the lack of evidence to warrant submission of this factor, where is the evidence that a slowing down was rendered necessary under the conditions
then obtaining~ The requirement to slow do\vn is not
absolute under the statute. It,is only when nece~ssary for
the safe operation of the truck. This involves a discretion on the part of the driver. There must be some condition shown. that would make it necessary to slow the
truck down to provide safe operation. The mere happen-
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ing of the accident does not prove that a slowing down
vvas necessary to safely operate the truck. The evidence
shows that Oberg's car suddenly and unexpectedly appeared from the opposite side of Nielsen's car into the
intersection. The speed of the truck, as testified to, was
not so fast as to furnish proof that the truck could not be
safely operated. It is common knowledge that the speed
testified to was not unusual. The speed given in several
of the cases hereto£ ore cited was in most instances as
great as is here involved.
Certainly this provision of the statute must apply
to the safe operation of the truck as such, and that is the
construction the court made of it in its instruction. The
requirement that the truck be operated with due regard
for the safety of others and not with reckless disregard
thereof is covered by the express provisions of sections
±1-6-14 and 41-6-76, U.C.A., 1953. The two provisions,
therefore, must not be synonymous. This provision that
there be a slowing down as necessary certainly must have
inherent in its application that conditions exist that would
require a slowing down such as someone being already
in the intersection with whom a collision is likely or that
the fire truck may be so driven that it will not collide
with persons or vehicles waiting in obedience to the law.
The wording of this part of this instruction is such
that it assumes that in any instance, regardless of the
speed shovvn by the evidence, a reduction of speed must
be made or the jury may f]nd negligence. The jury were
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not told to find whether under all the conditions shown l)y
the evidence that a slowing down was in fact necessary
in this instance to safely operate the truck. Under the
instruction as given the jury might very well assume
the mere happening of the collision is sufficient proof that
the speed was not reduced as was necessary for its safe
operation.
As pointed out in Point No. 8, the court furnished
the jury with no guide in determining what elements are
involved in the failure to slow down. Where must the
~slowing

down take

place~

Must it continue on into the

intersection and to the point of

impact~

The evidence

showed a reduction took p1ace to a point about 125 feet
north of the cross walk and then the speed was increased.
The jury might very well have believed the defendant
slowed down and then accelerated his speed, and yet under the instruction, conclude this was not a compliance
with the law. They were left, therefore, to their speculations with a wholly inadequate instruction. Finally, the
matter of failing to slo'v down was not in issue either
under the grounds of negligence charged in the complaint
or the grounds stated in the pre-trial order. We submit
that an allegation of driving at an excessive rate of speed
in excess of 35 miles per hour does not raise the issue
of whether a slowing down was necessary in order to
proceed against the red light. The statute expressly permits a speed in excess of the prima facie speed limits
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and in any case it 1night appear that the existing conditions would 1nake it necessary to slow down even below
the statu tory speed li1ni t.
POINT NO. 9. F AlLURE TO KEEP PROPER LOOKOUT.

The court instructed the jury that if the defendant
negligently failed to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles their verdict should be for plaintiff. This submits
to the jury the question of proper lookout upon the
same basis as if defendant were not driving an emergency vehicle. Nowhere in the statute is anything said
about a proper lookout. The standard of care to be exercised hy a driver of an e1nergency vehicle is contained in
subdivision 4 (e) of Section 41-6-14 and 41-6-76. Subdivi_sion -± (e) says that the driver of an emergency
vehicle shall drive with due regard for the safety of all
persons, the 1neaning of vvhich we have already established by the authorities heretofore cited. It also says
that the statute shall not protect him from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others.
It is apparent that this involves 1nore than the 1nere
negligent failure to observe soxne traffic rule or rule of
care. It involves a reckless disregard. Under the law
defendant had the right to assu1ne that persons on the
street \vould heed his warnings and yield the right of way.
Because of this he was not required to keep the same attentive lookout as others vvould be required to give. The
statute says he 1nay not recklessly disregard the safety
of others. This in itself infers that he will not be liable
for what \vould be 1nere negligence on the part of the
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driver of an ordinary vehicle. An analagous situation
is that of a driver and his guest when the former is not
liable to the latter for mere negligence but is for a reckless disregard for the guest's safety. We do not say
that failure to keep a look out is never involved where the
driver of an emergency vehicle is involved; what we say
is that the failure to keep a lookout must, under the circumstances involved, amount to a reckless disregard for
the safety of others, such as would be involved if the evidence showed that the other car was already in the intersection, plainly visible, or readily discoverable in time
for the fireman to stop, or otherwise avoid a collision.
The evidence would have to be of a character to sustain a
finding that he had the last clear chance to avoid the
collision.
We submit there is no evidence in this case showing
such a lack of proper control as to permit that issue being submitted to the jury. Defendant saw the traffic
stopped and waiting for him. There is no evidence whatever that Oberg's car was in such position to he observed
and at such a time as would indicate to defendant that
Oberg was not heeding his warnings and enable the defendant to avoid the collision. The evidence is all to the
contrary. Oberg's car came speeding from behind and
past Nielsen's car into the intersection in a flash. The
truck being then where it was, the collision was inevitable.
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POINT NO. 11. ERROR FOR THE COURT NOT TO INSTRUCT THAT DEFENDANT, HAVING DISPLAYED RED
LIGHTS AND SOUNDED THE SIREN, HAD COMPLIED
WITH THE LAW.

Defendant by his requested instruction No. 3 asked
the court to instruct the jury as follows :
'"The fact, if it is a fact, that Mr. Oberg,
driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding, did
not hear the siren or see the red light in time· to
stop and yield the rjght of way, or for any other
:reason failed to yield the right of vvay, would not
alter the right of the defendant to proceed through
the intersection and he would not be liable in this
action, unless it should appear from the evidence
that the defendant became aware, or in the exercise of due diligence, should have become aware
of Oberg's failure to yield the right of way in
time to have permitted defendant to avoid the
collision."
The defendant excepted to the failure of the court to
so instruct. All of the foregoing argument leads to the
point that the court should have instructed as defendant
requested. The evidence was undisputed, as found by
the court in Instruction No. 13, that defendant sounded
the siren and displayed red lights visible more than 500
feet in front of the fire truck. This was tantamount to a
finding that he was driving with due regard to the safety
of all others as held by the authorities heretofore cited.
There is no showing of a reckless disregard for others.
There is no showing that he failed to slow down as was
necessary for the safe operation of the truck. l-Ie had
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fully complied with the statutory conditions upon \vhieh
his exemption from traffic laws was based. He then had
a right to proceed through the red light, unless it should
appear from the evidence that defendant became aware,
or in the exercise of due care, should have become aware
of Oberg's failure to yield the right of way in ti1ne to
have permitted defendant to avoid the collision, assun1ing, of course, there was sufficient evidence to submit
the last clear chance to the jury.
POINT NO. 12. ERROR FOR THE COURT NOT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IF COLLISION WAS DUE SOLELY TO
OBERG'S NEGLIGENCE DEFENDANT WOULD NO·T BE
LIABLE.

In requested instruction No. 6, defendant requested
as follows:
"If you believe from the evidence that the
driver of the car in vvhich plaintiff was riding was
negligent under all the conditions shown by the
evidence in entering upon the intersection and not
stopping or otherwise yielding the right of way
to said fire truck, and you further find that the
driver of said fire truck was not at fault under the
conditions revealed by the evidence, then your verdict must be for the defendant, no cause of action."
Defendant excepte.d to th'e court's failure to so Instruct.
We have heretofore argued the proposition that the
court should have granted esur motion to dismiss and also
should have directed a verdict for defendant, one of the
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grounds in each case being that the evidence showed that
Oberg's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the
accident. We are now presenting the point that at the
least defendant was entitled to have that issue squarely
presented to the jury for its consideration. In Instruction No. 9, the jury were told that the act of one or more
persons may work concurrently as the efficient causes of
the injury, and each would be regarded as the proximate
cause. By Instruction No. 10, the jury were instructed
that if defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of
the injury he would be liable even though they should
also find Oberg was also negligent and such negligence
was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Nowhere
were the jury instructed as to the result if Oberg's negligence was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
By the court instructing as it did, the jury were permitted
to consider only the possible concurrence of defendant's
and Oberg's negligence. They were not permitted to
consider the eventuality of Oberg's negligence alone being
the sole proximate cause, or the effect that such sole
proximate cause, would have in relieving defendant of
liability. Clearly under the evidence of this case, and in

the interest of presenting the case fully and fairly to the
jury the defendant was entitled to have his requested instruction, or something similar, given to the jury and
the court's refusal constitutes prejudicial error.
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POINT NO. 13. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
IN EVIDENCE THE OPINION OF S. S. TAYLOR AS TO THE
SPEED OF THE FIRE TRUCK IN ANSWERING HYPOTHETI·CAL QUESTIONS WITHOUT PROPER FOUNDATION.

The hypothetical questions asked Taylor as to the
speed of the fire truck vvere based entirely upon th·e
observations and testimony of Officer Peterson. It assumed that Officer Peterson had testified as to all the
elements necessary so that the hypothetical question
would be based in all its parts upon the evidence in the
record, for Taylor had no first hand knowledge of these
necessary factors.
The hypothetical questions assumed that there were
two sets of tire marks, one made by the wheels on one
side and the other by the wheels on the other side, running the same direction, having the same characteristics;
that the tire 1narks indicated that the front wheels were
locked and sliding from the beginning to the end; that
both tire marks were continuous and uninterrupted.
Peterson did not so testify. He did not examine the right
tire marks, only the left ( p. 28, 33). He saw evidence of
front wheel tire marks on the left side, but not on the
right side (p. 32). He traced the left tire back to the
beginning but did not observe where the left front tire
took hold, nor could he tell how far the right front tire
went. We submit that under this state of the record there
was no foundation for the question. It is well to point out
too that Taylor in

an~wering

the question assumed to
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know what the four rear tires looked like as to wear
conditions by looking at the 2 front tires in a photo introduced as Exhibit P-1 (p. 184) and as to the nature of the
street surface by looking at this same ph.oto.
CONCLUSION
Fron1 the foregoing \Ve think it is apparent that the
judgment appealed from should be reversed. To hold defendant liable under the evidence in this case would be to
place a fireman driving in response to a fire in the same
category as the driver of an ordinary vehicle. The statutory exemptions granted hin1 would be a snare rather
than a protection in the faithful performance of his
duties. I-Iaving sounded his siren and having displayed
red lights all as required by the statute, and having observed that the traffic at the intersection was standing
and waiting for hi1n to pass, he was fully qualified to
take advantage of the statutory exemptions granted him
to proceed through the intersection. The burden was then
upon the plaintiff to show that he proceeded in reckless
disregard for the safety of others. Certainly no such recklessness is shown here, where Oberg's car suddenly flashed from behind a waiting car into the intersection in a
matter of a split second and when defendant was then
already in the intersection rendering the collision inevitable. We submit that the trial court should have
granted our motion to dismiss or directed verdict as requested by defendant. A reversal without a new trial
should be entered by this court.
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Should the court differ with us on the first conelusion, we respectfully submit that a reversal should be
entered and a new trial granted upon the errors in the
instructions referred to in this brief. These errors were
basic and were prejudicial to the defendant.
R.espectfully submitted,
E. R. CHRIS.TENSEN
City Attorn,ey
HOMER HOLMGREN
Assistwnt City Attorney
GAYLE DEAN HUNT
Ass~stant City Attorney
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